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LIVING TISSUE AND ORGAN DONORS AND
PROPERTY LAW: MORE ON MOORE
Bernard M. Dickens*
I. INTRODUCTION
John Moore's claim that his medical mistreatment' justified the award of
the three billion dollars he sought was likely to attract attention, but the
amount of compensation for which he sued was not as extraordinary as the
basis of his claim in property law. Moore first visited the University of Cali-
fornia's Medical Center at Los Angeles after learning that he had hairy-cell
leukemia. Samples were taken of his blood, bone marrow, and other body
substances to confirm the diagnosis. The defendant physicians became
aware that certain of Moore's blood products and components were of great
value to commercial and scientific enterprises and access to his blood af-
forded "competitive, commercial, and scientific advantages." 2 Upon recom-
mendations, Moore consented to the removal of his spleen, which occurred
in October 1976. Until September 1983, he regularly went to UCLA Medi-
cal Center from his home in Seattle in order to donate samples of blood,
blood serum, skin, bone marrow, and sperm.
Moore stated that while he was under treatment by the defendant physi-
cians, he was advised that the splenectomy and later donations of body sub-
stances were required for his health and well-being. He further complained
that the physicians concealed both research on his cells and their plans to
exploit financially their exclusive access to Moore as derived from the physi-
cian-patient relationship. By mid-1979, the physicians developed a cell line
from Moore's blood cells for which a patent was sought by the Regents of
the University of California in January 1981. The patent application listed
Moore's physicians as inventors and was approved in March 1984. The pat-
ent covered various methods of using the cell line to achieve biotechnological
products for which commercial firms in the industry had predicted a poten-
tial market of over three billion dollars by 1990. With the Regents' assist-
* Ph.D., LL.D., Professor of Law, Faculty of Law, Faculty of Medicine and Centre for
Bioethics, University of Toronto, Toronto, Ontario.
1. See Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990), cert. denied, I I
S. Ct. 1388 (1991).
2. Id. at 481.
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ance, the physician-inventors negotiated for and procured 75,000 shares of
common stock in a biotechnology company and payments of at least
$330,000. 3
Moore sued for conversion of his property. He also stated an additional
twelve causes of action, namely lack of informed consent, breach of fiduciary
duty, fraud and deceit, unjust enrichment, quasi-contract, bad faith breach
of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, intentional infliction
of emotional distress, negligent misrepresentation, intentional interference
with prospective advantageous economic relationships, slander of title, ac-
counting, and declaratory relief.4
At trial, the superior court reasoned that the twelve additional claims
were incorporated into the claim of conversion and expressly considered
only that cause of action. In dismissing the claim, the court concluded that
Moore had not stated a valid cause of action for conversion of his property.
The court's decision reflected the historic "no property" rule, which pro-
vides that there are no property interests that individuals can apply prospec-
tively to their own remains.5 Additionally, an individual's survivors can
only assert a so-called quasi-property right of burial or cremation. 6 On ap-
peal, however, the California Court of Appeal held that Moore had stated a
valid cause of action for conversion and remanded the case back to the supe-
rior court to decide that claim and the remaining causes of action on which
no express ruling had been given. The defendants appealed the court of ap-
peal's decision to the Supreme Court of California.
II. DECISION OF THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA
The majority of the Supreme Court of California based its approach on
the available causes of action for breach of fiduciary duty and lack of in-
formed consent to satisfy and redress any complaint that John Moore could
establish on the facts. Accordingly, the court remanded the case to the court
of appeal with instructions to direct the superior court to try Moore's case
regarding fiduciary duty and informed consent and sustain the superior
court's rejection of the claim for conversion. The majority stated that, "the
law already recognizes that a reasonable patient would want to know
whether a physician has an economic interest that might affect the physi-
3. Id. at 482.
4. Id. at 482 & n.4.
5. See Paul Matthews, Whose Body? People as Property, 36 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS.
193, 193 (1983); see also Margaret J. Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849,
1850 (1987).
6. Matthews, supra note 5, at 193.
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cian's professional judgment.",7 The court cited an earlier observation by the
California Court of Appeal that, "a sick patient deserves to be free of any
reasonable suspicion that his doctor's judgment is influenced by a profit
motive."8
Relying on legislation regarding physicians' commercial investments in
clinical laboratories and other health auxiliary services, the majority found
that physicians' conflicts of interest with their patients can be resolved by
prior and due disclosure to potential patients.9 While an alternative to prior
and due disclosure of conflicts of interest is complete prohibition, 10 the court
modified this prohibition and analogized to California's Business and Profes-
sions Code, which prohibits a physician from charging a patient on behalf of,
or referring a patient to, any organization in which the physician "has a
significant beneficial interest, unless [the physician] first discloses in writing
to the patient, that there is such an interest and advises the patient that the
patient may choose any organization for the purpose of obtaining the serv-
ices ordered or requested by [the physician]." 11
The court noted a similar duty of disclosing plans to conduct medical
experiments under California's Health and Safety Code.12 It emphasized,
however, that "no law prohibits a physician from conducting research in the
same area in which he practices. Progress in medicine often depends upon
physicians, such as those practicing at the university hospital where Moore
received treatment, who conduct research while caring for their patients."1 3
Although this observation does not in itself address whether such physicians
may lawfully engage their own patients as research subjects without the pa-
tient's knowledge, the court found that this would be permissible if prior
disclosure revealed any research interests which may be opposed to any in-
terests of the patients. The court held that, "a physician who is seeking a
patient's consent for a medical procedure must, in order to satisfy his fiduci-
ary duty and to obtain the patient's informed consent, disclose personal in-
terests unrelated to the patient's health, whether research or economic, that
may affect his medical judgment."14
The qualified solicitude the majority showed to medical researchers and
7. Moore, 793 P.2d at 483.
8. Magan Medical Clinic v. California State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 249 Cal. App. 2d
124, 132 (Dist. Ct. App. 1967), cited in Moore, 793 P.2d at 483.
9. Moore, 793 P.2d at 483-84.
10. See John K. Iglehart, Congress Moves to Regulate Self-Referral and Physicians' Own-
ership of Clinical Laboratories, 322 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1682, 1682 (1990).
11. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 654.2(a) (West 1990).
12. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 24173 (West 1984).
13. Moore, 793 P.2d at 484.
14. Id. at 485.
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biotechnological researchers influenced its treatment of Moore's claim of
conversion of property. The court first addressed the conversion claim
under existing law and observed that if the claim could not be sustained
according to prevailing precedents or principles, then extending the jurispru-
dence that did exist would cover or absorb Moore's novel assertion of liabil-
ity.15 Next, the court questioned whether Moore could show an actual
interference with his ownership or his right of possession of his cells, which
is necessary to establish conversion. 6 Because Moore had donated his cells
to his physicians, the court found that he clearly did not expect to retain
possession. Furthermore, no precedents existed to support Moore's claim of
ownership of his voluntarily donated tissues either directly or indirectly, 7
and California's statutory law was strictly interpreted to limit patients' con-
trol over excised cells. Indeed, the Health and Safety Code superseded other
state legislation in providing, "Notwithstanding any other provision of law,
recognizable anatomical parts, human tissues, anatomical human remains,
or infectious waste following conclusion of scientific use shall be disposed of
by interment, incineration, or any other method determined by the state de-
partment [of health services] to protect public health and safety.""8
This health and safety provision did not necessarily preclude Moore's
ownership of the cells since its primary purpose was only to ensure the safe
handling of potentially hazardous biological waste materials. Similarly, the
provision did not necessarily establish a competing claim of ownership in the
defendants, even though their possession of the virus infected cells derived
from the plaintiff and conformed to the required level of containment set for
such potentially biohazardous materials. 9 Nonetheless, the majority found,
the statute's practical effect is to limit, drastically, a patient's con-
trol over excised cells. By restricting how excised cells may be
used and requiring their eventual destruction, the statute elimi-
nates so many of the rights ordinarily attached to property that one
cannot simply assume that what is left amounts to "property" or
"ownership" for purposes of conversion law.2°
15. Id. at 493-97.
16. Del E. Webb Corp. v. Structural Materials Co., 123 Cal. App. 3d 593, 610 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1981).
17. For a discussion of the possibility of retaining an inchoate right of ownership in tissues
involuntarily severed from one's own body, see Bernard M. Dickens, The Control of Living
Body Materials, 27 U. TORONTO L.J. 142, 180-83 (1977).
18. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7054.4 (West Supp. 1992).
19. See AMERICAN TYPE CULTURE COLLECTION, CATALOGUE OF CELL LINES AND
HYBRIDOMAS 176 (Robert Hay et al. eds., 6th ed. 1988).
20. Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 492 (Cal. 1990), cert. denied, 11
S. Ct. 1388 (1991).
Organ Donors and Property Law
The majority acknowledged the distinction between physical control of
the cells, which Moore did not seek, and control of the commercial exploita-
tion of their scientific use, which was the basis of Moore's claim of owner-
ship and ultimate control. The judges considered, however, that the
plaintiff's ownership rights were suitably accommodated through his claims
for breach of fiduciary duty and negligence in failing to obtain his adequately
informed consent to donate tissue. Accordingly, the court directed that the
case be remitted for trial primarily on the basis of those claims.
The majority summarily dealt with the suggestion that Moore could claim
an ownership interest in the Regents' patent over the cell line and the prod-
ucts derived from it. The patented cell line was found to be both factually
and legally distinct from the cells surrendered by Moore. The cell line was
amenable to patent protection because it was a useful product of "human
ingenuity," whereas naturally occurring organisms are not patentable. 2'
Granting the Regents' patent constituted an authoritative determination that
the cell line was a product of invention since patent law rewards not only the
discovery of materials that are of natural origin but also inventive efforts that
make materials what they would not otherwise naturally become.
Having dismissed Moore's property claim under prevailing law, the ma-
jority then addressed whether the court should extend the existing scope of
property law to accommodate Moore's action for conversion. In their re-
view of existing law, the judges noted that legislation was promulgated for
public policy purposes. They observed that it is necessary to regulate the
disposition of such things as human tissues, transplantable organs, blood,
fetuses, pituitary glands, corneal tissue, and dead bodies to achieve policy
goals rather than abandon them to the general law of personal property.22
Two reasons were given for the majority's refusal to extend the existing
law of conversion to Moore's tissues. First, this extension was not needed to
protect his rights since there were alternative actions based on theories of
fiduciary duty and informed consent. Specifically, the court found that a fair
balancing of the relevant policy considerations weighed against extending
principles of property law and the tort of conversion to developers of cell
lines and their users.23 Second, as in the disposition of other body materials,
specialized legislation was considered the preferable medium rather than
judge-developed law.24
The majority did not claim that human cells could never be the subject of
21. See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980).
22. Moore, 793 P.2d at 489.
23. Id. at 493.
24. Id. at 493, 496.
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a property claim. On the contrary, the judges specifically stated that, "we do
not purport to hold that excised cells can never be property for any purpose
whatsoever .. ".."25 Concluding that Moore's claim of ownership of his
excised tissues should not be accommodated in property law, the judges con-
sidered it an important utilitarian matter, stating the importance of not
threatening "innocent parties who are engaged in socially useful activities,
such as researchers who have no reason to believe that their use of a particu-
lar cell sample is, or may be, against a donor's wishes.",
26
The 1987 report to Congress by the Office of Technology Assessment 27
reinforced sensitivity to the restrictive effects on biomedical research of the
potential for cell donor litigation. The report emphasized the uncertainty
about legally resolving any dispute that might arise between tissue donors
and subsequent users, which could impair the activities of both academic
researchers and the infant biotechnology industry. 28 Because of the way in
which cell lines are developed among teams of related researchers and re-
search facilities and often used by biotechnologically-equipped laboratories
and enterprises, products of an individual donor's cells are likely to be
widely distributed and employed over a considerable period of time. If re-
searchers and laboratories were forced to account to the donor, both would
be hindered by either legal or financial liability. Furthermore, the insurance
costs to laboratories could prevent research and industrial development from
being economically viable because insurance companies must ensure that ad-
equate funds are available to meet high compensation awards, as demon-
strated by John Moore's suit for three billion dollars.
The Office of Technology Assessment Report urged resolution of the un-
certainty regarding ownership of cells and cell lines. Because this undecided
factor was hampering the biotechnology industry, any resolution would be a
benefit to progress. 29 However, the majority in Moore had to make an arbi-
trary choice as to whether the donor possessed legal rights. If a donor had
been deceived or abused by nondisclosure of material information in the ac-
quisition of his cells, then actions based on theories of fiduciary duty and
informed consent protected the donor's legal rights to privacy and auton-
omy. The critical unfairness and dysfunction of a conversion claim is that it
25. Id. at 493.
26. Id.
27. U.S. CONG., OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN BIO-
TECHNOLOGY: OWNERSHIP OF HUMAN TISSUES AND CELLS-SPECIAL REPORT, OTA-BA-
337 (Washington, D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, Mar. 1987).
28. Id. at 27.
29. Id.
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invokes a theory of strict liability in tort30 in which a defendant's innocence
in acquiring cells and conscientious care of the patient is no defense. Be-
cause an action in conversion would not discriminate between wrongful and
innocent holders of a donor's cells and its resulting products, the majority
concluded that conversion law should not be extended to Moore's claim.3'
The majority was inspired by not only protecting innocent parties but also
liberating them from the burden of ensuring that the original donors con-
sented before acquiring and using their cells, cell lines, or other biotechno-
logical products derived from their cells. The court stated,
Research on human cells plays a critical role in medical research.
This is so because researchers are increasingly able to isolate natu-
rally occurring, medically useful biological substances and to pro-
duce useful quantities of such substances through genetic
engineering. These efforts are beginning to bear fruit. Products
developed through biotechnology that have already been approved
for marketing in this country include treatments and tests for leu-
kemia, cancer, diabetes, dwarfism, hepatitis-B, kidney transplant
rejection, emphysema, osteoporosis, ulcers, anemia, infertility, and
gynecological tumors, to name but a few ....
The extension of conversion law into this area will hinder re-
search by restricting access to the necessary raw materials.3 2
The majority also noted that the patent office requires holders of patents on
cell lines to make samples available to anyone, and cell lines are routinely
copied and distributed to other researchers for experimental purposes, usu-
ally without charge.3 3 Therefore, the court held that this beneficial degree of
access and exchange would be compromised if each cell sample became the
potential subject matter of property litigation.34
California case law was reviewed to discern the impact that expanded tort
liability had "on activities that are important to society, such as research." 35
The court recalled a judgment in which drug manufacturers had been held
immune from strict liability lest they be reluctant to market or even develop
beneficial products for fear of large damage awards for injuries not occa-
sioned by their fault.36 Analogizing this case to Moore, the court found that,
30. See generally Byer v. Canadian Bank of Commerce, 65 P.2d 67, 68 (Cal. 1937) (hold-
ing a bailee strictly liable for conversion of property despite innocent mistake).
31. Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 494 (Cal. 1990) (citations omit-
ted), cert. denied, III S. Ct. 1388 (1991).
32. Id. (citations omitted).
33. Id. at 495 & n.39 (citations omitted).
34. Id. at 495 & n.40 (citations omitted).
35. Id. at 495.
36. See Brown v. Superior Court, 751 P.2d 470, 477 (Cal. 1988), cited in Moore, 793 P.2d
at 495.
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"the theory of liability that Moore urges us to endorse threatens to destroy
the economic incentive to conduct important medical research."' 37 In pro-
moting research interests and protecting Moore's rights to pursue remedies
for breach of fiduciary duty and lack of informed consent, the majority 38
denied that Moore could assert a property right through an action for
conversion.
III. TISSUES AND ORGANS FOR TRANSPLANTATION
The development of products from human cells for therapeutic implanta-
tion into patients is a biotechnologically sophisticated procedure by which
human tissues and organs are directly transferred from a human donor,
whether or not alive, to a human recipient. The recognition that the Califor-
nia Supreme Court gave biotechnological medical research and cell line de-
velopment in the Moore case might be applicable a priori to transplantation
research and, even more so, recognized transplantation therapies. Accord-
ingly, the instrumental reasoning on property law and conversion liability
that the court applied in Moore might inspire similar reasoning regarding
direct transplantation to achieve the same goals of facilitating research and
achieving medical therapies for patients.
A legal distinction has been commonly drawn between tissues and organs.
Tissues are taken to mean bodily substances that are replaceable by natural
regeneration, such as blood and bone marrow; organs are understood to be
more discretely located structural arrangements of tissues that the body does
not regenerate, 39 such as kidneys. The distinction between regenerative and
nonregenerative body materials continues to be insightful for a number of
purposes, particularly in distinguishing materials that may lawfully be re-
moved from child donors on the basis of a parent's or guardian's decision.
For example, blood and bone marrow may be lawfully removed, while solid
organs such as kidneys may not be removed regardless of parent or guardian
authorization.'
The distinction has become blurred, however, by legislation that relies not
on a generic division of tissues and organs but rather on specific categoriza-
tions. For instance, the U.S. National Organ Transplantation Act defines
human organ as including bone marrow.4 The distinction is naturally con-
37. Moore, 793 P.2d at 495.
38. For a discussion of the dissenting opinions, see Laura M. Ivey, Comment, Moore v.
Regents of the University of California: Insufficient Protection of Patients' Rights in the Bi-
otechnological Market, 25 GA. L. REv. 489 (1991).
39. See Human Organ Transplants Act, 1989, ch. 31, § 7(2) (Eng.).
40. See, e.g., Ontario Human Tissue Gift Act, R.S.O., ch. H-20 (1990) (Can.).
41. 42 U.S.C. § 274e(c)(1) (1988).
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founded, moreover, by the realization that small areas of skin and slivers of
bone regenerate, whereas greater surfaces of skin and lengths of bone do not.
In fact, recent developments have shown that carefully defined liver seg-
ments regenerate spontaneously, although the liver, as a whole organ, does
not.42 Accordingly, the distinction between tissues and organs tends to be
specific to individual legal instruments and jurisdictions, since what may be
classified as tissue in one may be considered an organ in another.
A sharper distinction may be drawn between living and posthumous, or
cadaveric, donors. Recognizing a neurological or brain death criterion for
the end of human life has widened the potential for recovering, or "harvest-
ing," of transplantable organs immediately upon determination of death.43
Confusion occurs when legislation treats fetal tissues as if they are not de-
rived from the gestating woman but from the fetus itself. For instance, the
Uniform Anatomical Gift Act deals only with post mortem, as opposed to
inter vivos, recovery of transplantable materials, but includes fetal tissues."
While the legal personhood of previable and viable fetuses raises sensitive
questions, the placenta produced following successful childbirth is consid-
ered a valuable fetal tissue since it is used for pharmaceutical research of
whether drugs cross the placental barrier.
The application of Moore's rationale to transplantation of tissues and or-
gans is clearly demonstrated in reference to living, adult, mentally compe-
tent donors. Blood donations, like semen donations, tend to be given
without designating an individual recipient. When donations are offered,4 5
the donor may be subject to human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) testing
and, thereafter, the donation may be delivered to a clinic or tissue bank
rather than to any individual consumer. However, individuals may specifi-
cally designate that their blood be stored in anticipation of an autologous
blood transfusion either during or following surgery, or that their sperm or
ova be stored for their own diagnostic or reproductive use. On the other
42. See Whitington et al., Living Donor Nonrenal Organ Transplantation: A Focus on Liv-
ing Related Orthotopic Liver Transplantation, in ORGAN REPLACEMENT THERAPY: ETHICS,
JUSTICE, COMMERCE 117 (W. Land & J. Dossetor eds., 1991).
43. See U.S. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN
MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, DEFINING DEATH: A REPORT
ON THE MEDICAL, LEGAL AND ETHICAL ISSUES IN THE DETERMINATION OF DEATH 23
(1981).
44. The Uniform Anatomical Gift Act (UAGA) defines decedent to mean "a deceased
individual and includes a still born infant or fetus." UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT § l(b), 8A
U.L.A. 30 (1983). The UAGA has been adopted, with minor variations, in all 50 states and
the District of Columbia. 2 PHILLIP G. WILLIAMS, LIFE FROM DEATH: THE ORGAN AND
TISSUE DONATION AND TRANSPLANTATION SOURCE BOOK WITH FORMS 9 (1989).
45. For a discussion of the aqcuisition of living body materials through gifts, sales, and
gratuitous services, see Dickens, supra note 17, at 163, 166-71.
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hand, solid organs that living donors make available are almost invariably
intended for the benefit of specified recipients, such as close relatives. If an
individual receives no legally enforceable assurance that tissues or organs
that she may give from her living body will be employed only for her own
use or the benefit of a particularly designated recipient, then she may decline
to make such donations.
Individuals who provide for posthumous donation of their body materials
tend to donate them randomly or otherwise identify a recipient institution
such as a hospital or university. Similarly, those who exercise a dispositive
legal power over the tissues and organs of dead bodies, usually the de-
ceased's relatives, tend to dedicate them to institutions rather than specifi-
cally designated recipients. For instance, there is a practical difficulty in
finding well matched cadaveric kidneys for transplantation into African
Americans, which is further aggravated by the disproportionately low rate of
donation by such people.46 Programs have been designed which recommend
that African Americans direct posthumous donation of their kidneys to
other people of the same race.' 7 Such proposals and the general legislation
on posthumous donation of body materials affect the operation of the com-
mon law principle that there are no property rights in a dead body,4" except
the "quasi-property" interest regarding burial or cremation. 9 The common
law rule and current legislation fail to address the issue raised by Moore of
an individual living donor's legal interests in the tissues and organs he may
make available for transplantation into designated recipients. The primary
issue is legal control over tissues and organs, such as bone marrow, kidneys,
and liver segments, from the time they are released or removed from the
donor's body until they are implanted in designated recipients.
IV. MOORE AND THE RIGHTS OF LIVING DONORS
To extrapolate the rationale in Moore to tissue and organ gifts made to
designated recipients by living donors would presuppose that the priority
reflected in the court's approach to biotechnological development and pro-
gress in medical research would also be accorded to inter vivos tissue and
organ transplantation. However, grounds exist to disfavor gifts from living
donors and give priority to donations that take effect post mortem. In 1991,
46. See C.O. Callender, Organ Donation in Blacks: A Community Approach, 19 TRANS-
PLANTATION PROCEEDINGS 1551, 1551 (1987).
47. See Wayne B. Arnason, Directed Donation: The Relevance of Race, HASTINGS
CENTER REP., Nov.-Dec. 1991, at 13, 13.
48. P.D.G. Skegg, Human Corpses, Medical Specimens and the Law of Property, 4 AN-
GLO-AM. L. REV. 412, 412 (1975).
49. For an historical critique of the "no property" rule, see Matthews, supra note 5.
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the World Health Organization proposed Guiding Principles on Human Or-
gan Transplantation that included terms "intended to emphasize the impor-
tance of developing cadaveric donation programmes in countries where this
is culturally acceptable, and to discourage donations from living, genetically
unrelated donors, except for transplantation of bone marrow and of other
acceptable regenerative tissues."50
Under a mandate from the World Health Assembly, the World Health
Organization proposed the Guiding Principles to consider provisions
designed to contain "the trade for profit in human organs among living
human beings."'" Courts are wary of deliberately or inadvertently facilitat-
ing living donors to traffic their tissues or organs and rendering individuals
susceptible to financial inducements to enter a market of human body mater-
ials. When donors are unrelated to designated recipients genetically, by
marriage, or by long-standing affinity, suspicions may arise that unsavory
commercial incentives motivate the will to donate. In contrast, an individ-
ual's willingness to donate tissues or organs to others she knows is consid-
ered noble, altruistic, and honorably self-sacrificing according to the law.
Legislation and practice widely accommodate designated tissue and organ
donations by relatives to intended recipients, thereby offering legal
protection.
The California Supreme Court resolved Moore's property claim with the
express purpose of liberating commercial development of potentially thera-
peutic products and protecting "the economic incentive to conduct impor-
tant medical research. '"52 For this reason, it seems the court would have
been equally protective of altruistic incentives to contribute to important
medical therapy, which many tissue and organ transplantations are consid-
ered to be. The court applied instrumental reasoning in declining to extend
liability for conversion to Moore's cells, in order to enhance prospects of
medical benefit for all patients. If the evidence had shown that prospective
tissue and organ donors would more likely donate upon being assured that
they could invoke concepts of property law through claims for conversion
and give legal effect to their purposes, then the judges might recognize such
claims. The court preserved this prospect when it carefully observed that
"we do not purport to hold that excised cells can never be property for any
50. Guiding Principles on Human Organ Transplantation, Res. 40.13, World Health As-
sembly (May 1987), reprinted in Human Organ Transplantation: A Report on Developments
Under the Auspices of WHO (1987-1991), 42 INT'L DIG. HEALTH LEGIS. 389, 395 (1991)
[hereinafter WHO Report].
51. Id. at 390.
52. Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 495 (Cal. 1990), cert. denied, 111
S. Ct. 1388 (1991).
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purpose whatsoever .... , 3
There are few recorded instances when body materials donated for trans-
plantation into designated recipients were not properly used or were ren-
dered unuseable by negligence. In York v. Jones,54 heard by the District
Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, a married couple had given ga-
metes to the Jones Institute for Reproductive Medicine in Norfolk, Virginia
to combine them in vitro to create a pre-embryo 5' and store it by cry-
opreservation for eventual implantation in the wife. The couple moved to
Los Angeles and asked the Institute to transfer the frozen pre-embryo to a
local hospital for thawing and implantation. The Institute declined the
transfer because it purportedly fell outside the options agreed to in its con-
tract with the plaintiffs and because the transfer was not permitted by the
research protocol under which the Institute operated its in vitro fertilization
clinic. However, the court interpreted the language of the contract as afford-
ing the plaintiffs the right they claimed.
While the contract referred to property rights in pre-embryos created in
vitro, the plaintiffs reinforced their contractual claim with an independent
claim in detinue to recover their improperly retained property. This court
observed,
The requisite elements of a detinue action in Virginia are as fol-
lows: (1) plaintiff must have a property interest in the thing
sought to be recovered; (2) the right to immediate possession;
(3) the property is capable of identification; (4) the property must
be of some value; and (5) defendant must have had possession at
some time prior to the institution of the act. Moreover, if the prop-
erty is in the possession of a bailee, an action in detinue accrues
upon demand and refusal to return the property or upon a viola-
tion of the bailment contract by an act of conversion.
After review of plaintiffs' Complaint, the Court finds that plain-
tiffs have properly alleged a cause of action in detinue.56
The court's willingness to treat a pre-embryo, which has the biological po-
tential to develop naturally into a human being, as property indicates that
lesser cells such as tissues and organs which lack that natural potential may
also be treated as property.
In Moore, the court first asked whether Moore's removed cells were prop-
erty under prevailing law and concluded that they were not. Second, the
53. Id. at 493.
54. 717 F. Supp. 421 (E.D. Va. 1989).
55. For a philosophical contribution on the appropriateness of this expression, see Rich-
ard A. McCormick, Who or What is the Preembryo?, 1 KENNEDY INST. ETHICS J. 1 (1991).
56. York, 717 F. Supp. at 427 (citations omitted).
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court asked whether existing categories of legal property should be extended
to cover them and concluded that they should not. However, the court in
York v. Jones treated the pre-embryo as property according to prevailing
law. In view of the unresolved moral status of a pre-embryo in vitro, the
awareness of its inherent potential for human development, and the fact that
strongly held religious views believe that the pre-embryo is a person,57 the
court's application of principles of property law in York is striking. The
judgment indicates afortiori that transplantable tissues and organs, whose
moral status is not contentious and that have never been of inherent spiritual
significance, are property too. Nonetheless, Moore rejected the applicability
of property law because of California's Health and Safety Code provisions
on disposal of anatomical waste following scientific use"8 and the lack of
precedents establishing a property interest. While York's impact on prop-
erty law remains to be seen, the provisions on waste disposal which were
applicable in Moore are clearly not relevant to healthy tissues and organs
removed for the sole purpose of transplantation.
In determining instrumentally whether property law concepts should be
applied to the cells in question, the Moore court fashioned its rationale on a
long and reputable tradition of jurisprudence. In fact, ideas about the rela-
tion of persons to things are traceable to classical Greek philosophy, includ-
ing the discourse of Plato and Aristotle on the proper role of common and
private property in civil life. The evolution of modern concepts of the
proper role of property law has followed several paths, 9 although it appears
that contemporary legal scholars generally subscribe to a utilitarian or in-
strumental approach. Furthermore, one scholar has observed that
"[p]roperty, as a creature of law, is only justifiable (like all law) by utilitarian
considerations."' This approach, however, is not unchallenged and the ju-
ridical nature of property remains an issue of vigorous and varied
contention.
Present analytical jurisprudence dictates that the term "property" refers
57. See Davis v. Davis, 15 Fam. L. Rep. (BNA) 2097 (Tenn. Cir. Ct. 1989) (treating pre-
embryos as the equivalent of born children), rev'd, 16 Fam. L. Rep. (BNA) 1535 (Tenn. Ct.
App. 1990). See generally Bernard M. Dickens, Comparative Judicial Embryology: Judges'
Approaches to Unborn Human Life, 9 CAN. J. FAM. L. 180 (1990) (addressing the implications
of recent decisions which held that pre-embryos are human beings whose control is governed
by principles of child custody law).
58. See supra notes 17-19 and accompanying text.
59. For a historical review of modern concepts of property law, see Boudewijn Bouckaert,
What is Property?, 13 HARV. J.L. & Pun. POL'Y 775 (1990).
60. Francis S. Philbrick, Changing Conceptions of Property in Law, 86 U. PA. L. REV.
691, 730 (1938).
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to the "bundle of rights" a person possesses in a thing or an interest, rather
than simply the tangible thing or interest itself. Furthermore,
[t]he term "property" is sufficiently comprehensive to include
every species of estate, real and personal, and everything which one
person can own and transfer to another. It extends to every species
of right and interest capable of being enjoyed as such upon which it
is practicable to place a money value.61
The broad and abstract concept of property is molded by legislation and
common law declared by the courts in accordance with pragmatic and pol-
icy reasons. Although the Moore majority chose to reject the plaintiff's as-
sertion of a property right, it left room to hold differently in appropriate
circumstances.62
The dissenting judge in Moore, Justice Broussard, proposed such circum-
stances and found that the cells in issue were property according to prevail-
ing law. He observed,
In the transplantation context, for example, it is common for a liv-
ing donor to designate the specific donee-often a relative-who is
to receive a donated organ. If a hospital, after removing an organ
from such a donor, decided on its own to give the organ to a differ-
ent donee, no one would deny that the hospital had violated the
legal right of the donor by its unauthorized use of the donated or-
gan. Accordingly, it is clear under California law that a patient
has the right, prior to the removal of an organ, to control the use to
which the organ will be put after removal.
It is also clear, under traditional common law principles, that
this right of a patient to control the future use of his organ is pro-
tected by the law of conversion. 63
Justice Broussard's conclusion, however, is flawed because a contrast ex-
ists between Moore's cells and an organ donated for transplantation. Specifi-
cally, Moore's cells were without value and required the application of
sophisticated biotechnological techniques to realize their commercial utility,
while an organ is of imminent utility once preserved and prepared for trans-
plantation. In other words, Moore's cells had to be extensively processed
and refined before their potential could be extracted, whereas a donated or-
gan is transferred to its designated recipient fundamentally intact. Addition-
ally, the organ directly performs functions in the recipient that are virtually
identical to those performed in the donor; cell line products, in contrast,
61. Yuba River Power Co. v. Nevada Irrigation Dist., 279 P. 128, 129 (Cal. 1929).
62. See Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 493 (Cal. 1990), cert. denied,
11l S. Ct. 1388 (1991).
63. Id. at 502.
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depend on the artificial development of qualities in primary cells that they do
not normally possess." Lastly, an organ donor's control over the deploy-
ment of the organ is more feasible and immediate than a cell donor's control
over cells that are of no use in themselves but, if subjected to advanced scien-
tific processes, may form the basis of a biotechnologically engineered
product.
Justice Broussard's proposition is not entirely incompatible with the ma-
jority decision. In fact, the majority did not have to reject his conclusion
concerning property rights over organs for transplantation in order to assert
the absence of property rights over John Moore's extracted cells. Where
Justice Broussard found that prevailing law recognizes property interests in
transplantable organs, the majority was never forced to address or agree that
property law should be extended to such organs because the second issue
would have been preempted by Justice Broussard's original finding. The ma-
jority's discussion of the benefits of organ transplantation suggests that they,
too, would extend concepts of property law to transplantable organs. The
court recognized that organ donations offered direct health benefits to recipi-
ents which were immediately implemented through transplantation. Fur-
ther, the court suggested that potential donors may be encouraged to donate
if given legal certainty that, through recourse to principles of property law,
their designated purposes will be respected upon clinical assessment of the
suitability of their organs and the medical status of intended recipients.
V. DONORS' ALTERNATIVES TO PROPERTY LAW
The question remains whether a remedy for lack of informed consent or
breach of fiduciary duty would serve a transplantation donor better than, or
as well as, a property claim. In Moore, the defendant physicians allegedly
concealed the full purposes for which they sought consent for access to the
plaintiff's cells. In reviewing basic principles of patient autonomy and in-
formed consent,65 the court found that,
[t]hese principles lead to the following conclusions: (1) a physician
must disclose personal interests unrelated to the patient's health,
whether research or economic, that may affect the physician's pro-
fessional judgment; and (2) a physician's failure to disclose such
interests may give rise to a cause of action for performing medical
procedures without informed consent or [for] breach of fiduciary
64. Id. at 482 n.2.
65. The court offered three well established principles: 1) an adult of sound mind has the
autonomy to choose whether to submit to medical treatment; 2) a patient's consent to treat-
ment must be an informed consent; and 3) a physician has a duty to disclose all material
information to the patient's decision. Id. at 483.
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duty.66
In this case, John Moore initiated his relationship with the defendants for
therapeutic purposes, specifically the removal of his spleen to retard the pro-
gress of his hairy-cell leukemia. The physician performing the procedure,
however, was already aware that Moore's cells had unusual potential. The
court observed that the physician "had an undisclosed research interest in
Moore's cells at the time he sought Moore's consent to the splenectomy.
Accordingly, Moore has stated a cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty,
or lack of informed consent, based upon the disclosures accompanying that
medical procedure. ,67
In theory, physicians who ask to remove body materials for transplanta-
tion may have similarly undisclosed purposes of their own. However, do-
nors are more concerned with being reassured that, once organs or other
materials have been excised or otherwise procured, they will not be so negli-
gently mishandled that the purpose of transplantation will be frustrated. In
contrasting remedies for negligent mishandling under property concepts
with those under alternative principles of law, informed consent and fiduci-
ary duty principles will have little to offer if they center on physicians' inten-
tions that are undisclosed prior to acquiring the body materials.
When the risk of inadvertent or deliberate mismanagement is foreseen,
contractual terms may be proposed with those likely to be at fault. How-
ever, this offers limited protection to donors because intermediate handlers
of tissues or organs and those responsible for their implantation, both of
whom are essential to the enterprise, may decline to enter into contractual
agreements with donors. Similarly, when designated recipients or third par-
ties. pay the costs, donors are unlikely to have contract claims for the due
performance of agreements, and thus no remedies for violation. Further-
more, donors may lack an insurable interest in transfer of their donations.
Physicians who manage donations are unlikely to underwrite the perform-
ance of subsequent handlers. Nonetheless, the physicians' liability may arise
if they accepted responsibility for choosing them expressly or by implication
and were negligent in making or advising selections.
Liability for a physician's negligent damage to body materials in removing
or transfering them may be sought when a legal duty of care to the donor
exists either through a contract or the general tort law applicable to the
doctor-patient relation. Breach of duty may also be found due to the physi-
cian's negligent failure to conform to the legally required standard of care.
However, if medical personnel are paid by, or on behalf of, the intended
66. Id.
67. Id. at 485.
1992] Organ Donors and Property Law 89
recipient, then the legal duty to preserve and transfer the material may be
owed primarily to the intended recipient rather than the donor. If payment
for the transfer service is by neither the donor nor the intended recipient,
then the beneficiary of primary legal duties of care in preserving the material
may be more difficult to establish. On the other hand, even when the legal
duty is clearly owed to the donor, she may not successfully sue for damages
if the removal procedure is completed before the intention of her gratuitous
donation becomes frustrated. In this case, the donor suffers no personal in-
jury, although the donor may pursue a remedy for negligent or deliberate
infliction of emotional or psychic harm,6" the latter of which permits puni-
tive damages. The donor's success may depend upon the peculiar character-
istics of his personality and circumstances69 and the intermediate handlers'
awareness that the tissues or organ they process comes from a live, as op-
posed to a cadaveric, donor. Another consideration is whether the article
transplanted is destined for a designated or anonymous recipient. However,
it is unlikely that intermediate handlers are legally bound to inquire about
matters of this nature, although extended duties may arise if they are given
appropriate notice that both the live donor and the designated recipient an-
ticipate effective delivery of the material for transplantation.7°
Among his thirteen causes of action, John Moore's claim for negligence
was interwoven with his claim of lack of informed consent to treatment, 7'
although the former claim was based on alleged premeditation and delibera-
tion rather than the defendants' oversight. In addition, Moore filed claims
for negligent misrepresentation, fraud, and deceit, which similarly depend on
intentions alleged to have occurred prior to the induced donation of body
materials. His other claims included slander of title deriving from his asser-
tion of a property right, and unjust enrichment, which derived from the
riches the defendants had already negotiated to receive. However, this claim
would not avail a plaintiff when a defendant who rendered materials unsuita-
ble for transplantation was not enriched.
68. For a comprehensive and detailed statement supporting recovery for negligently in-
flicted psychic harm, see Peter A. Bell, The Bell Tolls: Toward Full Tort Recovery for Psychic
Injury, 36 U. FLA. L. REV. 333 (1984); cf. Richard N. Pearson, Liability for Negligently In-
flicted Psychic Harm: A Response to Professor Bell, 36 U. FLA. L. REV. 413 (1984).
69. See Carel J.J.M. Stolker, The Unconscious Plaintiff: Consciousness as a Prerequisite for
Compensation for Non-Pecuniary Loss, 39 INT'L & COMp. L.Q. 82, 96-100 (1990).
70. For a discussion of the potential liability of a doctor for refusing to transplant an
organ into a needy recipient until consent is obtained from the patient's next of kin, see Daniel
G. Jardine, Comment, Liability Issues Arising Out of Hospitals' and Organ Procurement Orga-
nizations' Rejection of Valid Anatomical Gifts: The Truth and Consequences, 1990 Wis. L.
REV. 1655.
71. See Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d 1, 8 (CaL 1972).
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VI. THE MERIT OF PROPERTY LAW
Principles of property law as applied to tissues and organs donated inter
vivos for transplantation raise questions about when the designated recipient
takes possession and at what point the tissues and organs lose their status as
the donor's property and become integrated with the recipient. Before the
tissues or organs become wholly integrated but after they leave the donor's
body, they are not necessarily res nullius or abandoned. With respect to
pathological, diagnostic, and waste body materials, the Maryland Court of
Special Appeals found that, as a matter of law, anyone who consents to sur-
gery does not abandon all removed tissue.72 However, the court also stated
that, "when a person does nothing and says nothing to indicate an intent to
assert his right of ownership, possession, or control over such material [as
comes from his body], the only rational inference is that he intends to aban-
don the material.""' Following this logic, when a person makes clear her
intention that the material should be transplanted into a designated recipi-
ent, that person asserts a right of ownership and control until the transplan-
tation takes place, even though possession may pass to others in the interim.
The observation based on body waste materials receives greater weight when
it concerns healthy organs or tissues intended for transplantation.
Property law, including such incidents as bailment of goods and liability
for conversion, affords those who directly procure materials for transplanta-
tion, specifically the intermediate handlers and the medical staff serving the
intended recipient, the knowledge that they are accountable to the donor for
their use and misuse of that material. Those who control property can law-
fully direct not only its use but also its return or deliberate destruction.
However, the principle remains that materials separated from the body can-
not be used except in accordance with either the donor's pre-release direc-
tions or subsequent adequately informed consent, particularly when dealing
with reproductive tissues. When couples deposit their gametes for in vitro
fertilization, they intend exclusive use for themselves and possess the legal
power to forbid any other reproductive use. If statutory or regulatory provi-
sions regarding human reproduction or research do not ensure exclusive
control over the materials and it is not explicitly stated in an agreement,74
then this exclusivity nevertheless arises as an incident of property law."
While legal title does not exclude abandonment in particular circum-
72. Venner v. Maryland, 354 A.2d 483, 498 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1976).
73. Id. at 499.
74. See generally York v. Jones, 717 F. Supp. 421 (E.D. Va. 1989) (questioning whether a
Virginia human research statute precludes parents from exercising exclusive control over their
frozen prezygote).
75. See Derek J. Jones, Artificial Procreation, Societal Reconceptions: Legal Insight from
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stances, it operates more positively to facilitate transfer of ownership to tis-
sue or organ banks, thereby confirming the legal title in the many tissue and
organ banks that exist worldwide. In the United States, for instance, re-
gional tissue banks, acting in conjunction with the American Association of
Tissue Banks, are indispensable in arranging over 300,000 musculoskeletal
grafts each year.76 In Western Europe, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Russia,
tissue banking has been established for over three decades." Multitissue
banks now operate effectively in Thailand, China, Myanmar, the Philippines,
and Vietnam.7 8 It can scarcely be contended that the level of activity of
these agencies, particularly in legally regulated environments, is maintained
without identifiable property rights over the materials they receive, process,
and transfer.
Resistance to the recognition of property rights in transplantable tissues
and organs stems in large measure from the fear that such rights would inev-
itably lead to unsavory and exploitative commerce, including donors' sales
to the highest bidder and the poor, induced by money, offering the substance
of their being to trade. Likewise, John Moore's property claim may have
been prejudiced because he too sought a profit from the use of his property.79
Voluminous literature opposes the commercialization of human body parts
from both living and cadaveric donors; however, emerging literature extols
the virtues of the marketplace in increasing access to transplantable tissues
and safeguarding personal integrity and tissue quality. The World Health
Organization has stated that commerce in property rights in transplantable
human organs can be restricted.8 ° Furthermore, the California Court of Ap-
peal, which upheld John Moore's property claim but was reversed by the
California Supreme Court, carefully emphasized that, "[t]o the extent that
unacceptable consequences, which can now only be the subject of specula-
tion, do follow, legislative solutions are possible and likely." 8'
An encouraging feature of the opposing bodies of literature is that protag-
onists and commentators throughout the spectrum offer feasible suggestions
France, 36 AM. J. COMp. L. 525 (1988) (analyzing the impact of a French case in which a
depository was ordered to return a deceased sperm depositor's sample to his widow).
76. Glyn 0. Phillips, Conference: Tissue Banks in Europe, 338 LANCET 1514, 1514 (1991).
77. Id.
78. Id. at 1515.
79. See Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 497 (Cal. 1990) (Arabian, J.,
concurring), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1388 (1991).
80. See WHO Report, supra note 50, at 396.
81. Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 249 Cal. Rptr. 494, 509 (Ct. App. 1988), aff'd
in part and rev'd in part, 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1388 (1991). In
agreement with the California Court of Appeal, the California state legislature promulgated a
law which prohibits donors from receiving any "valuable consideration" for donation. CAL.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7155(a) (West Supp. 1992).
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82for legal elimination of commerce, many of which do not depend on the
denial of property rights. Indeed, denial of property rights may itself lead to
commercial exploitation in the regulation of tissue and organ transfers. Rec-
ognition of living donors' property rights may forestall the emergence of an
unsavory and exploitative growth of payments for services associated with
acquiring tissues and organs, such as finders' fees and brokerage charges. If
living donors' property rights exist, then subsequent handlers may fear liabil-
ity for conversion. Thus, they will ensure legal and proper management of
tissue and organ acquisition. However, this principle applies to tissues and
organs that retain their inherent qualities and are directly traceable to a liv-
ing donor. This does not contradict the Moore judgment because the Moore
decision applies to cells subjected to biotechnological processes when tracea-
bility of cells is no longer convenient.
However, it may be asserted that, despite the application of biotechnologi-
cal processes, John Moore's cells were traceable because the cell line was
named the Mo cell line83 and because the defendants knew from whom the
cells were taken. The law must determine when property rights may be rec-
ognized in cells that are subject to biotechnological development as well as in
tissues and organs given by living donors for transplantation into designated
recipients. The instrumental reasoning of the Supreme Court of California
in Moore provides a starting point. The defendants certainly faced the in-
congruity of claiming that while John Moore cannot legally own his cells,
they can.84 Here the court draws a distinction between the cells when they
were extracted from Moore, at which point they had no use or value and
therefore were not property, and the cells when they were developed in the
possession of the defendants, whereupon they had patentable value. This
distinction raises the questions of the cells' value during their interim status
and whether John Moore's property interest in the cells was limited to prohi-
bition of use but not approval of use. A satisfactory response may be found
through the legal development of inchoate rights in these cells.85
VII. CONCLUSION
The majority in Moore approached the question of property rights in cells
extracted from a living person's body primarily in terms of public or social
82. See, e.g., Nancy E. Field, Note, Evolving Conceptualizations of Property: A Proposal to
De-Commercialize the Value of Fetal Tissue, 99 YALE L.J. 169, 185-86 (1989) (arguing for
federal legislation prohibiting the sale of fetal tissue but permitting the acquisition of fetal
tissue strictly through donative transfers).
83. See Moore, 793 P.2d at 510.
84. See id. at 492.
85. See Dickens, supra note 17, at 193.
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policy. The majority took this approach because of the absence of a prevail-
ing jurisprudence on whether or not property rights were already estab-
lished; accordingly, they drew inferences from state legislation hostile to
such rights. However, the dissenting justices in Moore invoked an applicable
jurisprudence and found that state legislation did not oppose it but rather
prohibits or could prohibit objectionable commerce of tissues and organs.
Nothing in the Moore decision suggests that living persons who intend to
donate tissues or organs for almost direct transplantation into designated
recipients may not invoke their property rights in such materials to advance
their own objectives. A body of case law exists that supports this contention.
Nonetheless, if this case law is not considered persuasive, then property law
should be extended to protect such donors' interests consistently with the
reasoning applied in Moore.
Courts are concerned that beneficial enterprises in medical advances and
individuals' health care not be obstructed. This concern would be served by
living donors being able to enjoy the certainty that, through principles of
property law, they could compel medical and related intermediaries to com-
ply with their altruistic intentions and make them aware of their continuing
interests in their donated materials. The Moore majority expressly drew
back from a claim that "excised cells can never be property."' 6 The speed
and scope of biotechnological processing of human cells into therapeutically
useful products cannot be reliably predicted, although it is anticipated that
tissue and organ donations from living persons will remain significant to
therapy. Accordingly, tissue and organ donations will continue to warrant
the law's instrumental protection through legal recognition of donors' claims
to control the destination and use of their in vitro body materials.
86. Moore, 793 P.2d at 493.
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